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Risk Budgeting and Longevity Insurance: Strategies for Sustainable Defined 
Benefit Pension Funds 
Abstract 
Today, many defined benefit pension funds across the world are closing in response to twelve years of 
intense market volatility and dramatic increases in life expectancy. To the casual observer, it must seem 
as though the risk of maintaining a defined benefit pension fund has contributed to its rapid decline. 
Certainly, a defined benefit pension is a very significant promise for the plan sponsor, who has pledged to 
pay the plan participants for as long as they live and no matter what happens to the assets. The key 
question today is whether the defined benefit plans that remain open and accruing benefits for employees 
can be sustained. In fact, a sustainability model may be emerging in the best practices of a few pension 
plans. These plans generally have three things in common:1. They have engaged in a rigorous risk 
budgeting process, involving an analysis of their risk, an estimation of the potential losses in their pension 
funds and a decision regarding how much they can afford to lose. 2. They have dramatically reduced their 
asset risk in an effort to keep pension losses within the risk budget and they may have two-thirds or more 
of their assets invested in a low volatility strategy such as fixed income or total return. 3. They have a 
strategy for longevity risk, which may involve longevity insurance to ensure that the quantum of their 
liability is known and knowable so that funding and investing activities can be carried out with certainty 
as to the ultimate liability. While these strategies may seem less exciting than using risky assets to reach 
for high returns, they are rooted in the premise that investing in equities, private equity, commodities, 
property and other risky assets actually involves risk and to the extent that those strategies expose the 
plan sponsor to more risk than the sponsor can afford, too much risk is likely to lead to the closure of the 
pension fund and the elimination of the defined benefit from the employees' future retirement security. 
Perhaps risk budgeting and disciplined risk management, combined with new techniques to insure 
longevity risk can be used to sustain more pension funds and safeguard the health of the plan sponsors. 
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Chapter 12
Risk Budgeting and Longevity Insurance: 
Strategies for Sustainable Defined Benefit 
Pension Funds
Amy Kessler
The extreme losses incurred in defined benefit (DB) pension plans during the 
financial crisis have called into question the conventional approach to manag-
ing pension risk. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many plans have closed 
and stopped accruing benefits for new or existing members. Closing a plan, how-
ever, only stems the growth in the pension risk—it does nothing to manage the 
risk the plan already has. Today, in the wake of unprecedented losses and with 
a new understanding of longevity risk, open and closed DB plans in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and other 
countries continue to search for a new paradigm that manages investment risk, 
longevity risk, and intergenerational risk.
Investment risk is the risk that asset performance falls short of expected returns. 
Twice in the past dozen years, plans that maintained a high allocation to risky 
assets have incurred losses severe enough to overwhelm many plan sponsors. 
Longevity risk is the risk that plan participants and eligible dependents live longer 
than expected. While longer life is a welcome development, it is also a significant 
financial obligation for pension plan sponsors, particularly where the retirement 
age has remained the same for decades. Intergenerational risk is the risk that cur-
rent employees contributing to a pension plan will support current retirees at the 
expense of securing their own future retirement benefits. In most open plans, the 
number of retired participants is rising much more quickly than the number of 
working age people contributing to the plan. This raises questions about sustain-
ability and fairness, particularly where pension deficits are acute, the credit qual-
ity of the plan sponsor is weak, and life expectancy is underestimated. Current 
employees contributing to such plans are exposed to the risk that the plan sponsor 
may not be able to fulfill its future obligations to them.
In today’s low interest rate and low-growth environment, these risks are par-
ticularly daunting and the failure to manage them is behind the growing funding 
gap for the many DB pensions. The key question is how to develop the strategies 
and solutions that will help pension funds regain and maintain a path toward a 
stable and sustainable future.
248 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
A ‘DB Pension Sustainability Model’ will combine techniques that already 
exist to achieve more predictable outcomes and manage risk within the plan spon-
sor’s financial wherewithal to absorb losses. The goal is to create a new paradigm 
for DB risk that draws from the best available practices in risk budgeting, asset 
management, and insurance. One possible approach is described in this chapter 
and it includes three components.
First, sustainable risk budgeting involves measuring the key sources of risk that 
a pension plan has in order to quantify potential losses, identify areas where risks 
compound each other, and establish a targeted level of potential risk of loss from 
which the plan and its sponsor could recover over the medium term.
Second is a sustainable asset management approach. With its risk budget in 
place, a pension plan can chart a course for a lower risk future, shedding the risks 
that are unrewarded (such as interest rate risk) and creating the opportunity to 
take risk that is rewarded (such as credit and exposure to equities and alternatives), 
all within a sustainable risk budget. Also, custom liability-driven investing (LDI), 
alternative fixed income investments, and absolute return strategies are among 
the key changes pension funds can make. As asset management choices evolve, a 
key paradigm shift takes place, bringing the liabilities squarely into the equation 
to choose assets designed to support the liabilities. The overall goal is a lower risk, 
lower volatility portfolio that creates a stable base for risk management and a good 
expected return relative to its risk of loss in funded status.
Finally, longevity insurance can be used to cover a DB plan’s most significant 
demographic risk and achieve three key objectives:  (a)  to create a known and 
knowable future obligation and ease the challenge of managing assets against 
unknown future liabilities; (b) to protect the solvency of the pension fund (and its 
sponsor) and secure the promises made to plan participants in the event of unex-
pected longevity; and (c) to addresses the impact of intergenerational risk on cur-
rent employees in the event of increasing obligations to retirees.
These strategies go hand in hand with the ability to increase the normal retire-
ment age as healthy life expectancy extends, and this approach can put pen-
sion funds on a path to a more sustainable future. To succeed, the DB Pension 
Sustainability Model must enhance retirement security for plan participants, 
include a robust safety net for disabled workers to retire early, and be flexible 
enough to adapt to the risk tolerance and financial wherewithal of plan sponsors of 
varied size, credit quality, and sophistication.
In what follows, we describe an approach to the DB Pension Sustainability 
Model. We look forward to a vibrant discussion of these ideas as the pension indus-
try focuses on helping individuals and institutions prepare for a longer retirement.
The Nature of Pension Risk
A DB pension is a promise to pay monthly retirement benefits to participants for 
as long as they live, no matter what happens to the assets. Plan sponsors who have 
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made these promises are surrounded by risk. The risk dial in Figure 12.1 shows 
the key sources of asset and liability risk that are part of the pension promise.
Liability Risk
The liability risks shown on the bottom half of the risk dial in Figure 12.1 include 
anything that might increase the amount of the benefit the pension fund owes to 
its members. Longevity risk is the key source of liability risk and is common to all 
DB plans. Many plans base retirement benefits on final or average salary, creating 
exposure to salary inflation until plan participants reach retirement age. In addi-
tion, some pension plans offer cost of living adjustments to retired participants and 
for them, inflation risk after retirement compounds the longevity risk exposure. 
Finally, interest rate risk is included in the liability risks because most pension 
liabilities are valued by discounting at a high-grade bond yield curve (the ‘liability 
discount rate’). This approach is consistent with the fact that pension liabilities are 
often the most senior debt of the plan sponsor.
The liability discount rate a pension fund uses to value its future obligations is 
the largest driver of the effective rate at which the liabilities grow from one year 
to the next (the ‘liability growth rate’). Other factors driving the liability growth 
rate include unexpected improvements in longevity and cost of living adjust-
ments offered to plan participants, if any. Failure to earn the liability growth 
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Figure 12.1. DB plan sponsors are surrounded by risk.
Note: Categories of asset and liability risks for sponsors of DB plans.
Source: Author’s illustration.
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rate on actual invested assets results in an increasing funding gap for the pen-
sion plan, with the liabilities growing faster than the assets. This challenge can be 
particularly acute for pension funds that offer cost of living adjustments to plan 
participants.
Asset Risk—The View for Corporate Pension Funds
Asset risks are shown on the upper half of the risk dial in Figure 12.1. As long-term 
investors, the conventional wisdom has been that pension funds should take asset 
risk, and so investing in equities, private equity, real estate, hedge funds, com-
modities and other risky asset classes has become the norm. Many pension funds 
invest 50 percent to 75 percent of their assets in these risky asset classes by choos-
ing asset managers in each desired ‘style box,’ rebalancing periodically to a pre-set 
asset allocation and measuring performance strictly against benchmarks that are 
not linked to the liability growth rate. The result of applying this strategy is that 
the value of the risky assets fluctuates in ways that bear no relation to the liabilities. 
In effect, with risky assets that have no duration and liabilities that have very long 
duration, the plan is ‘short duration’ and thus, duration mismatch is also shown on 
the risk dial as a key challenge for pension funds.
In the generally falling interest rate environment that has prevailed from June 
2007 to the present, remaining in a ‘short duration’ position has meant taking a bet 
that rates would not fall any farther. Unfortunately, with US$ ten-year Treasury 
bonds falling in yields above 350 basis points over the same time period (U.S. 
Treasury 2013),1 betting on steady or rising rates has been a losing proposition for 
pension funds, particularly given their present level of underfunding. For pension 
funds that remain in a short duration position and continue to bet on rising rates, 
it is useful to note that after the Great Depression, rates remained low (with the 
ten-year Treasury below 3 percent) for 19 years (Shiller 2013).2 In light of the sever-
ity of the recent financial crisis, as well as the credit contraction and deleveraging 
that ensued, low interest rates and low growth may persist for a prolonged period.
The key concern in maintaining a high allocation to risky assets and a short 
duration position is the risk of losing money that is not recovered over a manage-
able time horizon. Corporate pension funds generally think about this volatility in 
terms of the plan’s funded status, which is calculated as the market value of assets 
divided by liabilities discounted at the liability discount rate. When viewed from 
the perspective of the pension plan’s funded status, it is the extreme volatility of 
the conventional approach that is causing corporate pension funds the world over 
to rethink their risk and consider lowering their risk profile to the point where 
the potential losses are more affordable and more likely to be recovered over the 
medium term.
The evidence of volatility abounds and is directly linked to two facts. First, the 
average U.S. pension plan maintains a high allocation to risky assets of 50 percent 
to 75 percent. Second, the average U.S. pension plan is underfunded and finished 
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2012 with assets equal to just 76.4 percent of its liabilities (Milliman 2013). The 
unfunded liability is leverage and, as in any leveraged investing strategy, gains 
and losses will be magnified when measured relative to the full amount of the 
liability.
Figure 12.2 depicts the funded status of U.S. pension plans in the Milliman 100 
since the beginning of 2000, and U.K. pension plans in the FTSE 100 since the 
beginning of 2007. With regard to U.S. pension funds, these data show that from 
2000 through 2012, there have twice been losses of over 30 percent in funded sta-
tus terms. First there was the ‘dot-com bust,’ and then, from 2002 through 2007, 
U.S. sponsors of DB pension funds in the Milliman 100 contributed over $245 bil-
lion. With help from favorable markets, these U.S. plans returned to good health 
in 2007, just in time for the financial crisis of 2008, when they lost 30 percent in the 
downturn. The plans denoted made over $230 billion in contributions between 
2009 and 2012, and they will likely face significant contributions for many more 
years in order to approach full funding.
One of the most dramatic things about Figure 12.2 is the fact that, despite 
contributing so much cash from the end of the financial crisis through the mid-
dle of 2013, U.S. plan sponsors did not move to a sustained higher funded status. 
This is precisely because risk-taking remained the norm for the average U.S. plan 
throughout this period. Most U.S. plans in 2013 combine leveraged, high alloca-
tions to risky assets and a short duration position.
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Figure 12.2. Funded status volatility.
Note: Funded status data depicts the ratio of assets divided by liabilities of U.S. DB plans in the 
Milliman 100 (Milliman 2013) and U.K. DB plans in the FTSE 100 (Aon Hewitt 2013). Cumulative 
assets and liabilities are shown aggregated on an accounting basis.
Source: Milliman (2013) (Milliman 100 data); Aon Hewitt (2013) (FTSE 100 data).
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Consider the period from July 1, 2011, to August 19, 2011 (depicted in Figure 
12.3), when interest rates in the U.S. fell by 115 basis points and equities plum-
meted 16 percent (U.S. Treasury 2013; Bloomberg 2013).3 Given the asset and lia-
bility mismatch of the average U.S. pension plan in the S&P 500 at that time, their 
asset and liability values were independently volatile. Liabilities rose dramatically 
due to the decline in interest rates. In the meantime, assets plummeted because 
most of the assets were at risk in equities and other risk asset classes.
U.S. corporate pension funds have encountered this challenge before. In fact, 
any time bad news in the economy has caused interest rates and equities to fall 
simultaneously, the average U.S. pension plan has experienced dramatic losses 
in funded status. The 34 business days from July 1, 2011, to August 19, 2011, were 
no exception: with liabilities rising and assets falling, the average U.S. pension 
plan fell from 90 percent funded to only 78 percent funded (Aon Hewitt 2013).4 
With so much exposure to risk, the rebound one would have hoped for after such a 
dramatic six-week period was slow to materialize. U.S. plan sponsors ended 2011 
only 4 percent higher, with a funded status of 82 percent, and at the end of 2012, 
there was still no more sustained movement toward higher ground: the average 
U.S. plan was only 76 percent funded (Milliman 2013).5
July 1, 2011, to August 19, 2011: 
July 1, 2011 August 19, 2011 
90%
78%
Funded status
Liabilities
Assets 
Rates fall by 115 basis points;
equities fall by 16%
12% funded status decline
in less than two months 
Figure 12.3. Scenario—real life!
Note: For the period between July 1, 2011, and August 19, 2011, depicts the changes in assets, 
liabilities and funded status of U.S. DB pension funds in the S&P 500.
Source: Aon Hewitt (2013).
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Asset Risk for Public Pension Funds
While corporate pension funds in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada are focused on funded status, public plans are much more focused on 
long-term realized returns. Figure 12.4 shows the volatility of this approach over the 
most recent 20 years, assuming investment in the Russell 2000 Equity Index (Russell 
Investments 2013) and the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index (Barclays 2013).
The key goal for most public plans is meeting long-term return expectations, 
and the data show that a public pension plan investing in this manner will likely 
achieve its long-term targeted returns (often between 7.5 percent and 8.0 percent) 
on the assets it has invested. However, U.S. public pension funds rarely have assets 
invested that are commensurate with their liabilities; for most underfunded plans, 
the current approach is unsustainable.
A hypothetical U.S. public pension plan might have an expected return on 
assets of 7.75 percent. Its effective liability growth rate is also at least 7.75 per-
cent of the liabilities, because the future liabilities are discounted at the expected 
return on assets. This means that a failure to earn at least 7.75 percent on the 
full amount of the liability will result in a growing funding gap for the pen-
sion plan. It is worth noting that the actual liability growth rate may exceed 
7.75 percent, once unexpected increases in longevity and benefit cost of living 
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Figure 12.4. Volatility of returns—65 percent equities/35 percent bonds and cash.
Notes: The returns depicted are weighted actual returns, assuming 65 percent from the Russell 2000 
Equity Index and 35 percent from the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. Weighted returns are 
shown from December 1990 to December 2012.
Sources: Author’s calculations from Barclays (2013); and Russell Investments (2013).
254 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
adjustments are included. Figure 12.4 indicates that using a ten-year return on 
assets of 7.75 percent will lead many to believe that the plan is achieving its 
target. However, the public pension plan may be only 60–65 percent funded, 
so it only has 60–65 percent of the assets it needs earning returns. Historical 
data show that plans can reasonably expect to earn 7.75 percent on the invested 
assets. But plans can reasonably expect to earn zero percent on the unfunded 
liability, which can best be thought of as the ‘allocation to air’ in the portfolio. In 
fact, the unfunded liability represents leverage in the investment strategy. As in 
any levered investment strategy, gains and losses will be magnified when meas-
ured in relation to the liability.
A natural question thus arises: how difficult will it be for this hypothetical public 
pension fund to overcome the unfunded liability, meet current benefit payments, 
and maintain or improve funded status? Figure 12.5 shows how daunting this 
challenge is. With 62.8 percent of the liabilities invested and earning 7.75 percent, 
and the remainder unfunded and earning zero percent: (a) the plan likely needs to 
earn 10.9 percent or 11 percent to remain at its present funded status and avoid an 
increasing funding gap; and (b) without cash contributions to improve the funded 
status, the plan likely needs to earn 12.7 percent or more on a sustained basis to 
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Figure 12.5. The impact of leverage and the disconnect between assets and liabilities.
Note: The return required to maintain or improve the funded status is calculated by Prudential 
assuming a typical open public plan in the U.S. with cost of living adjustments in its benefits, a 
starting funded status of approximately 63 percent, and benefit payments that increase by 5 percent 
per year.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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reach 80 percent funding within ten years. This analysis assumes no unexpected 
increase in longevity and no periods of higher than expected inflation.
This analysis demonstrates the depth of the public pension crisis in the United 
States and in many other countries where the leverage in the pension fund requires 
an unrealistically high realized rate of return in order to avoid an increasing fund-
ing gap. It is for this reason that most public pension funds need to consider one 
further aspect of a DB Pension Sustainability Model—a Sustainable Contribution 
Strategy that will bring potential earnings on actual invested assets into line with 
the year-on-year growth in the liabilities.
Longevity Risk Is Material and Often Left Out of 
the Risk Equation
A recent Global Financial Stability Report by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF 2012) explains that actuarial science has historically underestimated life 
expectancy by a period of three years. To be fair, the poor record around the 
accuracy of longevity projections has been driven by the incredible power of 
human ingenuity to develop medical treatments that extend human life and it 
is clear that increasing longevity is a very positive outcome for many. However, 
for sponsors of DB pension funds, increasing longevity also creates a significant 
financial obligation that governments, institutions, and corporations will strug-
gle to afford.
The IMF report also points out that ‘appropriate longevity assumptions should 
use the most recent longevity data and allow for future increases in longevity’ 
(2012:  6). The same report suggests that ‘the use of outdated mortality tables 
has been a common practice’ among U.S. pension plans and that many in the 
IMF sample analysis exhibited a ‘lag of almost a quarter century in their mortal-
ity assumptions’ (2012: 13). A similar challenge exists in many countries, where 
measurement of current liabilities has not kept pace with known and observ-
able improvements in longevity that have already occurred. The U.K. and the 
Netherlands are global role models in mandating the use of up-to-date tables, 
while progress remains slow in North America.
As the IMF has pointed out, updating pension mortality assumptions for pur-
poses of estimating today’s liabilities is fundamental in creating the transparency 
that key stakeholders need in order to evaluate the impact of longevity risk on the 
credit quality of governmental, institutional, and corporate plan sponsors. Merely 
updating mortality assumptions is not enough, because there is still uncertainty 
around today’s best estimate projections of future pension liabilities. Pension 
funds must begin to consider how longevity risk interacts with all of their other 
risks and, in many cases, compounds them!
Figure 12.6 depicts the pure longevity risk in a pension fund with 36 percent 
retiree liabilities and 64 percent deferred and active liabilities, though no future 
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accrual is assumed for active members. The average age of retired members is 69 
and the average age of deferred and active members is 46. Benefits include cost of 
living adjustments, which are assumed at a fixed escalation rate of 3 percent in the 
graph. The solid line is the best estimate projection of the liability assuming the 
fixed cost of living adjustments and the grey bars indicate the risk around the best 
estimate determined on a stochastic basis where longevity is the only risk factor 
simulated in the stochastic analysis. For every year that life expectancy extends, 
the liability will likely increase by 5 percent or more. A more severe stress would 
increase the liability by 8 percent to 10 percent from current annuitant mortality 
tables but this analysis only stresses longevity.
Since this pension plan offers cost of living adjustments to plan participants, 
the risk of longevity and inflation combined is much larger. In the event that plan 
participants live longer than expected and inflation is higher than expected, the 
liability could increase by 20 percent because the longevity risk is compounded by 
inflation risk (see Figure 12.7).6 The increase in risk is relevant for any U.S. pub-
lic pension plan and any plan (public, institutional, or corporate) in the U.K., 
Canada, or elsewhere that offers a cost of living adjustment.
The fact that liability-side risks compound each other leads to an important 
conclusion about risk modeling and risk management. It suggests that hedging 
and risk transfer decisions must be made in the context of a fully stochastic anal-
ysis of all risks. Hedging and risk transfer decisions made without a combined 
stochastic model that brings liability risks into the picture will consistently under-
value the benefits of risk management strategies.
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Figure 12.6. Materiality of longevity risk assuming fixed inflation.
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escalation rate of 3 percent. Longevity improvements are simulated in a fully stochastic analysis.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Bringing Longevity Risk into the Picture
To demonstrate the importance of the compound nature of longevity risk, inter-
est rate risk, and inflation risk, it is useful to consider a different example pro-
vided by Guy Coughlan of Pacific Global Advisors. In this example, there are 
1,000 retired pension plan participants, all aged 65 and all receiving the same 
level of benefit today. There are also 1,000 active pension plan participants, 
all aged 45 and all expecting to receive the same benefit at their retirement in 
20 years. The base mortality tables assume the U.S. male population, taken 
from the LifeMetrics Index. Inflation is expected to be 2.5 percent. In the fixed 
liability results, only salary inflation is assumed through the retirement date of 
the active pension plan participants with no benefit escalation after retirement. 
In the inflation-linked liability results, both salary inflation to the retirement 
date and escalation after the retirement date are assumed. The benefit payments 
are shown in Figure 12.8 for the fixed liability and the inflation-linked liability 
cases.
Thus the pension fund is not well funded and is holding assets of $600, equal to 
only 60 percent of the liabilities, assumed to be $1,000. Despite its underfunded 
position, the plan has already begun to make its way down a de-risking path and 
holds its assets invested in 45 percent fixed income, 33 percent equities, 19 per-
cent alternatives and 3 percent cash. Figure 12.9 provides a risk overview for this 
plan. It shows the funded status-at-risk or value-at-risk (‘VaR’) in the pension 
fund, reflecting the financial risk in the asset portfolio, as well as the market and 
longevity risks impacting the liabilities. For pension funds, funded status-at-risk 
is analogous to the VaR measures used by other types of financial institutions. 
Potential variability in future benet cash ows
due to longevity risk
Li
ab
ili
ty
 ca
sh
 
ow
s
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Years
Range of outcomes
(5th to 95th percentile)
Expected benet
cash ow A 95th percentile outcome
might increase the liability
by 20% if both longevity
and ination are stressed. 
Figure 12.7. Compounding of longevity risk and inflation risk.
Note: Shows the same pension liability as depicted in Figure 12.6 with both longevity improvements 
and future inflation simulated in a fully stochastic analysis.
Source: Author’s calculations.
258 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
Funded status-at-risk measures the level of financial risk to the funded status of 
the pension fund, taking assets and liabilities into account. Figure 12.9 shows the 
amount of the potential loss in funded status at a 95th percentile stochastic stress 
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Figure 12.8. Illustration of fixed liability and inflation-linked liability cash flows (nor-
malized pension payment). 
Notes: Panel A: Fixed liability; Panel B: Inflation-linked liability. Depicts normalized pension 
payments for 1,000 retired and active plan participants aged 65 and 45, respectively, for fixed 
liabilities and inflation-linked liabilities.
Source: Analysis from Pacific Global Advisors.
 Risk Budgeting and Longevity Insurance 259
over a period of one year. The stress depicted below can be considered a reason-
able worst-case scenario for a one-year period.
The individual asset and liability risks shown here depict the 95th percentile 
outcome of a stress in each risk in isolation. For example, asset risks (shown in the 
left-most column on each graph) include the risks to equities, interest rates, and 
alternatives and they reflect a 95th percentile risk of loss in each asset class stressed 
independently. The asset risks are the same in the two cases because each assumes 
a portfolio of $600 invested identically. In normal market conditions, these losses 
would not be expected to occur simultaneously—rather, some of these losses will 
be diversified away, as described further on in the chapter.
The liability risks are shown in the second column of each graph in Figure 12.9. 
The liability risks differ in the fixed liability and inflation-linked liability cases. 
Relatively speaking, the inflation-linked liability has greater longevity exposure. 
This is intuitive, in light of the graphs shown in Figures 12.6 and 12.7, which 
demonstrate that the risk of longer life and high inflation compound each other. 
In other words, with inflation-linked benefits, a pension fund promises to make 
monthly benefit payments to its members that will keep pace with cost of living 
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Figure 12.9. Risk overview for fixed liability and inflation-linked liability cases (VaR). 
Analysis of a reasonable worst-case loss scenario for a one-year period for the hypothetical 
pension plan depicted in Figure 12.8.
Panel A. Fixed liability deterministic stress.
Panel B. Inflation-linked liability deterministic stress.
Source: Analysis from Pacific Global Advisors.
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adjustments. Should inflation be higher than expected, each additional year of life 
carries with it approximately twice the impact on the liability, because the benefit 
will be payable in future value terms. For years, we have described this exposure 
as ‘longevity risk on steroids.’
It is also of interest to note that the inflation-linked liability has less inter-
est rate risk than the fixed liability. This is due to the fact that liabilities rise in 
low interest rate conditions, which are also commonly linked to low infla-
tion environments. If inflation is low, the inflation-linked liability would bene-
fit from lower-than-expected cost of living adjustments. This finding (in which 
inflation-linked liabilities are less interest rate-sensitive than nominal liabilities) is 
consistent with the fact that inflation-linked government bonds are less volatile in 
price terms than comparable nominal bonds.
The third bar in each graph in Figure 12.9 shows the diversification benefit 
that naturally arises because the risks detailed in the first two columns are not all 
expected to arise at their 95th percentile levels at the same time. Risks in the pen-
sion fund, whether on the asset or the liability side, are not perfectly correlated and 
they generally are not expected to occur together and in extremis. Consequently, 
the risks should diversify each other.
One of the best examples of a natural diversification benefit is longevity risk 
and equity risk, which are often thought to be unrelated risks—they may both 
occur in extremis by chance but the conventional wisdom is that there is no reason 
to expect them to both occur simultaneously in extremis and thus, the diversifica-
tion benefit of holding the combination of risks is significant.
Another key source of diversification benefit is the relationship between inter-
est rate risks on the asset and liability side. A 95th percentile outcome for interest 
rate risk on the asset side would generally occur when rates rise and fixed income 
assets fall in value. In contrast, a 95th percentile outcome for interest rate risk on 
the liability side would generally occur when rates fall, pulling down the discount 
rates used to value the liability and causing the present value of the liability to 
rise. These two circumstances are negatively correlated and offer a fairly direct 
hedge to the extent that the pension plan holds fixed income assets that are key 
rate duration-matched to the liability and are of similar credit quality to the liabil-
ity measurement benchmark. The diversification benefit of the individual risks is 
substantial and can be thought of as reducing the pension fund’s funded status-at-
risk by taking into consideration the fact that some of the risks are not correlated 
(such as longevity and equity risk), while others are negatively correlated (interest 
rate risk on liabilities vs. interest rate risk on assets).
The Total Risk column in Figure 12.9 is shown on the right of each graph. As 
a result of the diversification benefit, the Total Risk column is materially lower 
than the sum of the Asset Risk and Liability Risk columns, which depict the 95th 
percentile risk of funded status loss on each risk measured in isolation. For clarity, 
the Total Risk column shows the 95th percentile risk of funded status loss on the 
total combination of asset and liability risks, after taking the diversification ben-
efit into account. As expected, the total risk results show that the inflation-linked 
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liability has more total risk and less diversification benefit than the fixed liability 
case. This is the natural conclusion because the actual liability growth rate of the 
inflation-linked liability (with cost of living adjustments) is more likely to outpace 
the earning power of the assets than in the fixed liability case, and this risk of 
growth in the liability outpacing the growth in the assets is unlikely to be diversi-
fied away by the assets this pension plan is holding.
A Simpler View of Crossover Risk
Many find the three-dimensional nature of stochastic VaR analysis challenging 
to interpret because the conclusions depend on the correlation matrix embed-
ded in the statistical risk analysis, which drives the degree of diversification ben-
efit among the risks. To address these concerns and provide a two-dimensional 
anchor for the risk analysis, it is also useful to look at deterministic stress alongside 
the stochastic analysis.
Coughlan’s approach to the deterministic stress is to construct a stress that 
is reassuringly similar to a duration calculation.7 For the fixed liability and the 
inflation-linked liability, Figure 12.10 shows the impact on the liability of a 1 per-
cent decline in interest rates and a 1 percent per year increase in the future pro-
jected trend for mortality improvements (also referred to as ‘q-duration’). Results 
are shown separately for the older retiree population (the 65-year-olds) compared 
to the younger deferred members (the 45-year-olds) who have yet to retire. We 
conclude that longevity risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk compound each 
other. In each case, the combined stress is greater than the sum of its parts (the 
interest rate stress and the mortality stress), because an interest rate shock will 
have a bigger impact on the liability if the liability increases due to an expectation 
of longer life. The difference between the value of the combined shock and the 
sum of the two individual shocks (interest rates and mortality) is referred to as the 
‘crossover rate and mortality risk,’ and is broken out separately in Figure 12.10.
Both the combined stress and the crossover rate and mortality risk are bigger in 
the inflation-linked liability case than in the fixed liability case because inflation 
compounds both the mortality and interest rate risks. Also, both the combined 
stress and the crossover rate and mortality risk are bigger for the deferred liabili-
ties (the 45-year-olds) than the retiree liabilities (the 65-year-olds) because of their 
longer duration. The analysis proves that deferred liabilities are the most risky 
obligations for the pension fund.
Implications of Crossover Risk for Risk Analysis 
and Risk Management
Given the key conclusion that interest rate risk, longevity risk, and inflation risk 
compound one another in the pension liability, it is clear that the current standard 
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practice of leaving longevity risk out of pension risk analysis will lead to an under-
estimation of total risk. This is particularly acute for inflation-linked liabilities and 
deferred liabilities, where their longer duration makes them significantly more 
sensitive to adverse outcomes. Pension funds and industry practitioners that make 
risk budgeting, risk management, and risk transfer decisions without taking these 
crossover risks into consideration will underestimate potential losses as well as the 
potential benefits from risk management and risk transfer strategies.
To this point, we have focused on pension asset and liability risk and on quanti-
fying and understanding these risks in a manner that is more comprehensive than 
current general market practice. From this point forward, we focus on what these 
conclusions about risk actually suggest for risk management in the context of a DB 
Pension Sustainability Model.
The Role of Risk
For most pension funds, the conventional strategy has relied upon asset risk-taking 
activities to minimize overall contributions to the pension plan. Toward that 
end, investment activities are often focused on endowment principles of retaining 
liquidity premiums, earning risk premiums, and maximizing diversification ben-
efit. In carrying out this strategy, most pension funds have hoped to earn enough 
return to outrun increasing life expectancy and offer generous pension benefits 
with modest contributions. As shown in Figures 12.2 through 12.4 of this chapter, 
the key issues associated with this strategy include: (a) the lack of focus on the lia-
bility and its risks; (b) the volatility; and (c) the risk of loss that cannot be overcome 
in the medium term.
The challenge for the pension industry today is to modify the conventional 
endowment strategy to moderate the role of risk. Figures 12.2 through 12.5 pro-
vide the historical data that demonstrate the need for a change in general pension 
risk management practices. In the new paradigm, the role of risk must be more 
carefully harnessed than has been the case in the past. Potential losses must be 
budgeted so their impact on required pension contributions in the medium term 
is affordable for the plan sponsor. Within the overall risk budget, pension plans 
should still retain liquidity premiums, earn risk premiums, maximize diversifica-
tion benefit, and seek to minimize overall contributions.
The key change is that all of these activities would be limited and controlled 
within the risk budget and, within that risk budget, risk-taking would still have an 
important role to play in pension risk management.
Managing Total Risk and Risk Budgeting
In managing the total risk exposure of a pension fund, we have said that it is 
important to ensure that the potential losses are budgeted so that their impact 
on required pension contributions in the medium term is affordable for the plan 
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sponsor. We expect very few to disagree with this goal because losses that are not 
affordable can impair the sponsor’s credit quality or render the sponsor insolvent, 
leaving the plan without adequate resources to pay benefits to plan participants. 
To bring our broadly stated objective forward into risk practice, it is important to 
be specific and define each element.
Potential losses refer to funded status-at-risk or total risk as shown in the right-most 
bar in each of the graphs in Figure 12.9. This is the potential loss in funded status 
in a reasonable worst-case (95th percentile) scenario that takes into consideration 
asset risks, liability risks, and diversification benefits. We are focused on funded 
status-at-risk because this is the amount the plan sponsor would need to contribute 
in cash to overcome these potential losses.
Budgeting the impact on required pension contributions refers to managing the pen-
sion fund’s asset and liability risks to try to keep potential losses below a specific 
funded status-at-risk or total risk level. Again, the plan sponsor may have to make 
contributions of cash to overcome these potential losses, and it is the potential 
cash contributions that need to be budgeted and affordable in order to ensure 
sustainability.
Medium term refers to the plan sponsor’s reasonable time horizon for recovery 
from a market disruption. In some circumstances, the reasonable time horizon 
will be driven by regulation in the home country or province of the plan sponsor. 
For example, U.K. corporate pension funds are generally required to make cash 
contributions to recover from pension deficits within three to five years. U.S. cor-
porate pension funds will increasingly focus on a seven-year horizon in light of 
the guidelines in the Pension Protection Act (PPA). Plan sponsors in Ontario also 
have a prescribed period over which they must recover. These regulatory recovery 
periods can help plan sponsors define the ‘medium term’ because cash contribu-
tions may be required over this period to restore the pension fund to good health. 
In instances where there is no regulatory requirement for recovery, as is the case 
for U.S. public sector pension funds, it will be more challenging, though no less 
important, to establish a disciplined construct for budgeting potential losses.
Affordable for the plan sponsor will have a different meaning for every sponsor. In 
tailoring the definition of ‘affordability’ to each unique obligor, we recognize that 
public pension plans will need to control the impact of potential losses to ensure 
the loss is affordable in terms of the sponsor’s debt burden or future tax burden. 
In contrast, corporate plan sponsors will need to control the impact of potential 
losses to ensure the loss is affordable in terms of their debt burden, considered 
alongside such other factors as shareholders’ equity and free cash flow. Today, the 
vast majority of pension plan sponsors fail to manage the funded status-at-risk so 
that it is affordable in the context of debt burden, future tax burden, shareholders’ 
equity or free cash flow, but this is the key step in risk budgeting. It is worth consid-
ering each of these key metrics in turn.
Debt burden. Today, credit analysts are increasingly aware of the nature of 
unfunded pension liabilities, which are the debt of the plan sponsor and which 
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may come ahead of any other debt or equity. Losses in the pension fund increase 
the sponsor’s debt and, as such, growing pension deficits are increasingly a factor 
in rating downgrades and credit analyst commentary. A corporate, institutional, 
or municipal plan sponsor must determine whether losses in an amount equal to 
the funded status-at-risk would have a detrimental impact on its debt burden if the 
potential losses were realized. Given the nature of unfunded pension liabilities, 
key stakeholders consider: (a) whether potential losses would cause a debt rating 
downgrade or result in negative credit analyst reviews if realized; (b) whether any 
debt covenants would be violated; and (c) whether market access or other credit 
objectives (such as target debt ratios) of the sponsor would be threatened.
Impact on tax burden. This metric is relevant only to public plan sponsors whose 
pension plan contributions are funded by tax revenues or user fees. Losses in the 
pension fund may increase the sponsor’s required contributions and create pres-
sure on tax revenues or, where tax revenues cannot be raised, the pension contri-
butions may displace needed public services. A public plan sponsor must consider 
whether losses in an amount equal to the funded status-at-risk would have a det-
rimental impact on its tax burden if the potential losses were realized and the 
requisite contributions were made to restore the pension fund to good health. Key 
stakeholders consider: (a) whether the potential losses and resulting contributions 
would cause tax rates to rise substantially; (b) whether there are legal, constitu-
tional, or practical limits on the potential tax increases that might be violated; 
(c) whether tax revenues would need to be diverted from public services to make 
the contributions; (d) the probability that the municipal entity would be down-
graded; (e) whether market access or other credit objectives of the sponsor would 
be threatened; and (f ) whether residents and businesses would choose to locate in 
other municipalities to avoid the increasing burden of pension risk.
Impact on shareholders’ equity. For corporate plan sponsors, losses in the pension 
fund that increase the company’s debt burden also reduce its shareholders’ equity 
because the increase in net effective debt does not create any investment in the 
enterprise nor any earning power for the firm. Current accounting rules appro-
priately capture this reality in the balance sheet mark-to-market approach that 
prevails today for corporate pension assets and liabilities in the U.S., U.K., and 
Canada, among other countries. Given the importance of shareholders’ equity to 
investors, many companies are now considering whether the funded status-at-risk 
would have a detrimental impact on shareholders’ equity if the potential losses 
were realized. It is particularly important to do this analysis for the plan sponsor 
alongside all of the other companies in the plan sponsor’s industry peer group to 
determine the extent to which the plan sponsor would underperform its peers in a 
down market. Cyclical companies must also be very focused on these calculations 
because cyclical companies are likely to see declining equity values in the same 
market conditions that are challenging for the pension fund.
Impact on free cash flow. To the extent that pension losses trigger a requirement to 
contribute cash to the pension fund, a corporation’s free cash flow can be severely 
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impacted by pension risk. Moreover, free cash flow is at the foundation of share-
holder value creation, which has led to the reasonable conclusion that ‘cash is 
king.’ Toward that end, we see companies with limited free cash flow taking the 
lead in pension de-risking to minimize potential cash calls on the company and 
ensure more consistent financial results within their industry peer groups. There 
was a raging debate in the United States before the recent financial crisis as to 
whether it was in the best interest of plan participants to moderate or budget the 
risk taken in the pension plan to ensure that potential losses would be affordable 
from the perspective of the plan sponsor. However, by the end of 2012, the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation in the United States was responsible for benefits to 
members of over 25,000 U.S. pension funds whose sponsors had previously filed 
for bankruptcy (PBGC 2013). As a result of these insolvencies, the benefits payable 
to many of the plan participants were capped below their original levels and the 
plan participants experienced the double challenge of a simultaneous decline in 
their retirement security and their job security. If potential pension losses are unaf-
fordable for the plan sponsor, plan participants may face this difficult situation.
Allocating the Risk Budget: Choosing Your Risks
Once a plan sponsor defines its risk budget, the focus often turns to trimming 
overall risk to bring funded status-at-risk down to the targeted level. In this exer-
cise, pension plans most often begin with a risk assessment such as the one shown 
in Figure 12.9 of this chapter. The risk assessment helps to quantify the risks the 
pension fund is running in order to begin an analysis of which risks to keep, which 
risks to manage, and which risks to shed.
From the point of the initial risk assessment, there are three key considera-
tions in determining a risk reduction strategy. First, the risk assessment clearly 
identifies the largest sources of risk, where the greatest impact of risk manage-
ment can be achieved but charting a successful course to a lower risk future is 
never as simple as attacking the largest risks and trimming them back. Second, 
it is critically important to consider which risks the plan believes are rewarded 
risks and which are unrewarded in order to prioritize rewarded risk-taking 
within the risk budget. Finally, the balance of risks is the key to an optimal out-
come so that the plan makes the most of the diversification benefit available in 
its portfolio of risks.
In the risk reduction journey, we have seen several leading plans establish the 
following core principles. First, before risk reduction, interest rate risk, inflation 
risk, and longevity risk create a substantial amount of risk for the plan, but: (a) these 
risks compound each other; (b) each carries with it a lower expectation of returns 
than equity risk and investments in alternatives; and (c) within the overall risk 
budget, prioritizing rewarded over unrewarded risks is fundamental. Second, in 
reducing the overall level of risk, interest rate risk, inflation risk, and longevity risk 
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should be trimmed ahead of equity risk and investments in alternatives. Third, 
to make the most of the diversification benefit among the risks, no risk should be 
completely eliminated. Fourth, the liabilities matter, so younger plans with a lot 
of deferred and active participants will take more risk than mature plans that are 
primarily composed of retirees.
The following section describes two real pension plans—one corporate and 
one public—that have applied these principles to successfully reduce their pension 
risk.
Case Study: A Closed Corporate Plan in  
a Cyclical Industry
Several closed corporate plans in the United Kingdom have dramatically 
reduced risk by applying the principles described above. They typically began 
with the realization that longevity risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk are 
‘unrewarded’ risks that need to be balanced and managed carefully within a risk 
budget.
One such plan (depicted in Figure 12.11) was extremely good at fixed income 
asset management; it brought its portfolio allocation up to 70 percent to 75 percent 
fixed income, including illiquid fixed income (such as private placement loans, 
commercial mortgages, inflation-linked ground leases, and high-quality credit 
card and auto loan ABS). The fixed income portfolio was built over many years 
and in many interest rate environments and allowed the plan to address its interest 
rate risk very effectively. Inflation risk was hedged or managed through invest-
ments. The remaining 25 percent to 30 percent of the portfolio was in equities, 
absolute return, and other alternatives, meaning that the plan could benefit from 
the diversification of risk among its various asset classes.
By the time the pension plan was invested in 70 to 75 percent fixed income, 
its downside risk was very well managed, but its upside earnings potential was 
greatly diminished too. The plan no longer had enough potential in its portfolio to 
earn its way out of an unexpected increase in life expectancy. The solution chosen 
by this plan was to run its asset portfolio alongside a longevity insurance transac-
tion providing both asset and liability risk management. This strategy works for 
any large, sophisticated plan sponsor, though cyclical companies have the biggest 
incentive to reduce risk because the biggest pension losses arrive in downturns 
when equities and interest rates are falling simultaneously. These are the same 
moments when the business would need to conserve cash to manage through the 
business cycle. For this cyclical company, having a properly risk-managed pension 
plan (with a funded status-at-risk below its risk budget) meant that it could solidify 
its industry leadership, create more consistent financial results, and manage from 
a position of strength in down markets. Eliminating this fundamental risk to the 
company also enhanced the retirement security and the job security of the plan 
participants.
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Case Study: An Open Public Plan
The risk budgeting and risk management strategy described above is not only 
for corporate plans. Public pension plans can pursue these strategies as well 
even though many public plans are still open and actively accruing benefit for 
plan participants. In these circumstances, the plan is likely to insure its lon-
gevity risk and target a higher asset risk level than a closed, mature plan, as 
shown on the right side of  Figure 12.11. One public plan that pursued this 
strategy combines longevity insurance with a diversified asset portfolio that is 
one-third bonds and cash, one-third equities, and one-third absolute return. Its 
strategy is based upon risk budgeting and the strong belief  that longevity risk 
is unrewarded, particularly when combined with (and compounded by) inter-
est rate risk and inflation risk. The plan’s CIO saw the exposure to longevity 
risk as a bond that routinely lost 2 percent or more each year. To put a floor on 
those losses, the plan decided to hedge away the longevity risk on the retirees 
and turn the liability into a known and knowable future obligation. The risk 
budget previously taken up by longevity exposure could then be re-allocated to 
rewarded risk-taking in the asset portfolio.
This is a revolutionary concept, made possible by longevity insurance. Pension 
funds can now choose to hedge longevity risk as an unrewarded risk and redeploy 
that risk allocation to rewarded risk-taking in the asset portfolio.
Many have asked what plan participants might gain from this risk management 
approach. The answer is likely retirement security. In an open plan for a public 
entity that is still accruing benefits for current employees, there is a fundamental 
Closed Plan
Longevity risk is insured or hedged
Open Plan
Risk budgeting is used to gauge
whether potential losses are
aordable—longevity risk is insured or
hedged
Bonds and cash Equities Absolute return hedge fund
Figure 12.11. Sustainability model.
Note: Summarizes a sustainable asset and liability strategy for a closed plan and an open plan, 
respectively.
Source: Author’s illustration.
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question of  whether the plan is adequately reserved for the longevity risk of  current 
retirees and, if  it is not, what impact that will have on current employees contribut-
ing to the plan. Managing asset risk and hedging the longevity risk of  the retirees in 
the plan can address the intergenerational risk current employees face in circum-
stances where pension deficits are acute, the credit quality of  the plan sponsor is 
weak, and life expectancy is underestimated. This is the essence of  the DB Pension 
Sustainability Model as it brings into practice techniques for managing investment 
risk, longevity risk, and intergenerational risk in today’s open pension plans.
Lessons Learned from Monoline Pension Insurers
There are many differences between most pension funds and the world’s best-run 
pension insurers, but first we will focus on the similarities. Both are monolines 
that have written pension annuities and therefore grapple with asset risk and lon-
gevity risk. The similarities generally end there, because monoline pension insur-
ers manage their blocks of business under insurance principles, while the pension 
funds, with the same annuity liabilities, remain focused on the endowment prin-
ciples of retaining liquidity premiums, earning risk premiums, and maximizing 
diversification benefit to minimize overall contributions. The key differences are 
presented in Table 12.1.
The key to bringing the DB Pension Sustainability Model into practice is not to 
bring pension funds to manage risk fully under the insurance principles applied 
to the monoline pension insurers. Rather (in order to address the risks shown 
in Figures 12.2 through 12.5 of this chapter), the focus is on finding the happy 
medium between the two models for pension funds that seek to sustain themselves 
for the long run. The goal is to be able to keep the pension promises they have 
made and provide retirement security for plan participants even in the face of 
shifting demographics and increasing longevity. The halfway point between the 
insurance model and the conventional pension model is a moderate approach 
with plans: (a) managing just below fully funded status without any reserves or 
capital behind the risk; (b) maintaining a low volatility asset strategy that is heavy 
in fixed income and absolute return with a modest allocation to risky assets to 
Table 12.1 Comparison of pension funds and monoline pension insurers
Pension Funds Monoline Pension Insurers
Funded level Generally underfunded Fully funded plus reserves & capital
Asset strategy High allocation to risky assets Asset and liability matching
Longevity risk strategy Generally unhedged Generally reinsured
Risk budgeting Generally not applicable Potential losses < capital and reserves
Source: Author’s tabulation.
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benefit from diversification of asset classes; and (c) hedging the longevity risk of 
their retirees to ensure sustainability even in the face of longer life.
This moderate approach is designed to benefit from much of  the stability of  the 
insurance model, without the extra capital and reserves it requires. At the same 
time, the moderate approach continues to take advantage of  some of  the diversifi-
cation benefit among asset classes that is the hallmark of  the conventional pension 
approach. By combining the two models, it is possible to help pension funds develop 
an approach to moderate risk and bring potential losses into an affordable range.
Conclusion
People are living longer lives but the normal retirement age in most countries has 
been the same for decades. As a result, there is a demographic shift observable 
within many pension plans: the number of retired persons to be supported by the 
plan is rising much faster than the number of working age people contributing to 
the plan. This intergenerational risk creates an acute need for open pension plans 
to move retirement age later with increases in healthy life expectancy.
While this demographic shift continues unabated, a low-growth/low interest rate 
environment is creating a substantial funding gap for plan sponsors. Maintaining a 
high risk profile to bridge the gap may result in investment losses as unaffordable as 
they have proven to be in the first decades of the twenty-first century.
Today’s path for pensions is unsustainable. This chapter develops a way to 
budget and moderate risk, provide for increasing longevity, manage the intergen-
erational risk in the pension plan, and create greater certainty that participant 
benefits can be met. The retirement security of many pension plan participants 
depends upon it.
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Notes
 1.  This reflects the history of the ten-year U.S. Treasury, taken from the Daily Treasury 
Yield Curve, which was at its highest level in nearly six years on June 12, 2007, at 
5.26 percent and has generally fallen for the five ensuing years, to 1.43 percent on July 
25, 2012.
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 2.  The ten-year Treasury rate data collected by Shiller (2013) show rates below 3 percent 
for 19 years from 1934 to 1953.
 3.  Interest rate data are for ten-year U.S. Treasuries, taken from the Daily Treasury 
Yield Curve (U.S. Treasury 2013), which was at 3.22 percent on July 1, 2011, and 
2.07 percent on August 19, 2011. Equity data reflect the S&P 500 Index, which closed 
at 1339.67 on July 1, 2011, and 1123.53 on August 19, 2011 (Bloomberg 2013).
 4.  Cumulative assets (in US$billions) and liabilities of all pension schemes in the S&P 
500 index on the accounting basis.
 5.  This assumes a pension fund with 36 percent retiree liabilities and 64 percent deferred 
and active liabilities, though no future accrual is assumed for active members. The 
average age of retired members is 69 and the average age of deferred and active mem-
bers is 46. Benefits include cost of living adjustments, which are simulated in a fully 
stochastic analysis. Longevity improvements are also simulated in a fully stochastic 
analysis.
 6.  This assumes a pension fund with 36 percent retiree liabilities and 64 percent deferred 
and active liabilities, though no future accrual is assumed for active members. The 
average age of retired members is 69 and the average age of deferred and active mem-
bers is 46. Benefits include cost of living adjustments, which are simulated in a fully 
stochastic analysis. Longevity improvements are also simulated in a fully stochastic 
analysis.
 7.  See also Coughlan (2014).
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